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“Perfect Conscience”: Hamlet,
Christopher St. German’s Doctor and
Student, and the English Common
Law
Carolyn Sale
1 I here extend my earlier work on Hamlet and early modern English law to questions of
conscience, and specifically the terms in which Hamlet berates himself for being one
instance of the general phenomenon in which “conscience does make cowards [of us
all]” (III.i.82).1 The sense of incapacity that Hamlet expresses both in his most famous
soliloquy and the earlier “O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I” (III.i.550) is one
produced not only in relation to doubt in God, uncertainty about the possibility of an
afterlife, or the predicament of having his father’s ghost inform him that his uncle has
murdered his father. The two soliloquies present us, rather, with a predicament shaped
by matters of class and matters of law, and the debilitating role that Hamlet assigns to
conscience in the second ties back to the specific form of legal debilitation that he
refers  to  in  the  first.  In  that  special  theatrical  scene  of  “hailing”  which so  greatly
anticipates Althusser’s “little theoretical theatre” of interpellation,2 Hamlet turns on
himself  with  a  particular  charge,  “Am  I  a  coward?  /  Who  calls  me  villain?”  (II.ii.
506-507), that reflects the very specific ways in which England’s historical common law
produced legal incapacity. Attention to this makes Hamlet important to contemporary
imaginings of law, and not just for those cultures that take the English common law as
inheritance.
2 The legal inflection is clear when we read Hamlet’s self-beratement in “O what a rogue
and peasant slave am I” and his declaration about conscience in “To be or not to be” in
relation to one of the most popular books on law in early modern England, Christopher
St.  German’s  Doctor  and  Student.  St.  German’s  book,  first  written  in  1528,  helps  us
illuminate  the  connection  between  Hamlet’s  seeming  incapacity  to  act  and  a
fundamental problem of the English common law. When he demands of Horatio in Act 5
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whether it would not be “perfect conscience” for him to “quit” Claudius with his “arm”
(V.ii.67-68), Claudius having now not only stolen the crown but also having attempted
to bring about Hamlet’s death, Hamlet uses a phrase that features in the conversation
between the two fictional characters of St. German’s famous dialogue, a book of such
popularity amongst students of law in early modern England that it was published in at
least five editions across Shakespeare’s lifetime, and remained in use at the Inns of
Court  through  to  the  nineteenth  century.  Neither  Hamlet’s  nor  the  Doctor  and
Student’s  exercises of  “conscience” in their  respective fictional  domains are in fact
“perfect.” But in their very failures they point towards precisely what is required of
any common law that would claim to act for or from “perfect conscience” or would
enable exercises of “perfect conscience” by those for whom it obtains.3
3 St. German’s Doctor and Student is a fictional dialogue between a Doctor of Divinity (or
canon  law)  and  a  Student  of  the  common  law  in  which  the  characters  commit  to
challenging, from the perspective of conscience, various kinds of litigation allowed by
the  common  law.  The  characters  discuss  the  various  forms  of  action  available  at
common  law  to  litigants  pursuing  property  interests  to  consider  which  forms  of
litigation can “stand with conscience” and where the law is, as a matter of conscience,
“to be left.”4 The book is an unusual one, as the legal historian J.H. Baker has noted, for
“the  relationship  between  the  common  law  and  conscience  was  not  universally
accepted.”5 Conscience was the entity with which Chancery concerned itself as a court
of resort for those seeking an equitable supplement to the common law and judgments
at  common  law  by  which  they  believed  they  had  been  wronged.  Common  law
jurisprudence concerned itself, on the other hand, with seeking the “common reason”
by which cases could be decided in public, forensic arenas in relation to previous cases
understood to be in one way or another like the one before the court.6 This is not to say
that conscience was not operative in common law courts, but rather that it played its
role indirectly; the courts could always decide that a judgment in a previous case that
appeared to be like the one before them had been taken on poor grounds, or produced
one or another kind of “inconvenience” (that is, produced an ethical concern that the
current court could not ignore if it decided the historic case was in one way or another
applicable), but conscience was not exercised as it was in the equity courts of Chancery,
where the Lord Chancellor was free to make direct recourse to his singular conscience
to decide a case.7 Common law reasoning, as Edward Coke famously asserted in his early
seventeenth-century Reports, involved the specialized practice of “artificial reasoning”
which  excluded  anyone  except  trained  institutional  practitioners  from  directly
participating in the law’s forms of reasoning, but while the common law’s “reason”
might be specialized,  it  was the product of serjeants-at-law and justices working in
concert to argue and decide the rationale that ought to determine the outcome of a
case.8 St. German’s book was unusual in that it aimed to open up questions about the
conscientiousness of the law to a general readership. In St. German’s “radical common
law ideology,” the common law was to be construed not merely as a product of the
courts but as an entity to be shaped by all those for whom it obtained.9 
4 In Doctor and Student, St. German pursued this “radical” ideology through the exercise
of conscience by which everyone purposefully put themselves into an active relation to
law. Accordingly, St. German’s Student asserts:
Many unlearned persons believe that is lawful for them to do with good conscience
all things, which if they do them, they shall not be punished therefore by the law,
though the law doth not warrant them to do what they do, but only, when it is
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done,  doth  not  for  some  reasonable  consideration  punish  them  that  do  it,  but
leaveth it  only to his conscience. And therefore many persons do oft-times that
they  should  not,  and  keep  as  their  own  that  that  in  conscience  they  ought  to
restore.10
The disposition that the book encourages, one in which readers will not seek to keep
something “as their own that […] in conscience they ought to restore,” works counter
to the common law’s general aims in regard to property, which (following Roman law)
seek to “giue to euery one his owne.”11 Those that have lands by “recoveries” at law
that cannot be justified in conscience “ought,” the Doctor argues, “to be compelled to
restitution.”12 Hamlet’s conscience, we might argue, works well enough in this regard.
Hamlet displays great contempt for those who are “spacious in the possession of dirt”
(V.ii.87-88), and his disquisition on the first skull that he holds in his hands in Act 5, the
skull that he imagines to be that of a lawyer, is one through which he expresses his
sense of the energy that goes into the promotion and protection of property interests
as  a  waste  of  intellection:  “[Is  this  the  fine  of  his  fines,  and  the  recovery  of  his
recoveries]  to have his  fine pate full  of  fine dirt?” (V.i.106-107).  There is,  however,
another  form  of  intellection  that  is  at  stake  for  the  common  law,  one  that  is  not
individual but collective. When Hamlet turns on himself as someone he imagines being
called  a  “villein,”  he  makes  himself  generally  representative  of  a  problem  of  the
common law that affects not only the conscientious relationship of any individual in
early modern England to the English common law, but the common law’s status as
conscientious  entity.  Both  St.  German’s  genealogy  of  law and his  discussion  of  the
feudal figure of the “villein” help us articulate the problem.
5 St.  German  strives  to  tie  the  common  law  of  England  irrevocably  to  questions  of
conscience by situating it within a genealogy in which it is a branch of the law of God.
The  genealogy,  as  set  out  in  Part  I  of  Doctor  and  Student,  subordinates  the  law  of
property in England to the law of reason, with both of the branches of the “secondary
law of reason,” or the law of property, being, the characters aver, merely “suffered” by
the law of God.13 It is the task of conscience, as the means of applying “knowledge to
such things as are to be done,” to ensure the right relation of the law of God and the
manmade law of property, and disallow any contradiction between them. It therefore
follows that “the most perfect and most true applying” of reason “to any particular act
of man” will ensure “the most perfect, the most pure, and the most best conscience.”
Any “default in knowing of the truth of such a law, or in the applying of the same to
particular acts,” will, moreover, St. German continues, result in “an error or default in
conscience,” for “Sinderesis ministreth an universal principle that never erreth, that is
to  say,  that  an unlawful  thing is  not  to  be  done.”14 The achievement  of  “the  most
perfect […] conscience” thus involves a two-fold challenge. One must have knowledge
of law, and one must have the power to apply one’s knowledge to “particular acts.”
Strictly speaking,  however,  very few people directly participate in the processes by
which knowledge of law is applied to “such things as are to be done” in institutional
legal arenas to produce the judgments of law. This is precisely the problem that Doctor
and Student seeks to address. St. German talks about the “knowledge of the law” that
one  may  acquire  according  to  one’s  “capacity,”  but  the  challenge  is  for  the  law
meaningfully to engage the capacities of all. Every individual conscience must have the
opportunity to contribute to the collective conscientious matrix or “common reason”
from which the law is made.
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6 St. German’s theory is clear enough. In their turning away from a system of law that
permits  proprietary  holdings  that  cannot  be  reconciled  with  conscience,  or  with  a
disposition to property consistent with the values of the law of God, individuals will not
simply assert the primacy of one law (the law of reason as derived from the law of God)
over another (the law of man, especially the law of property). They will compel the
formal  jurisdictions  of  the  law of  property  to  shrink.  They  will  take  what  the  law
“leaveth” to them, and leave the mechanisms that would permit them, of “colour,” to
take  from  others,  and  in  so  doing  they  will  leave  the  law  with  considerably  less
business.  Where  the  idea  of  the  necessary  conscientious  engagement  with law  is
sufficiently taken up—where many consciences work to enact a general refusal of the
populace to avail themselves of the “recoveries” available to them under the secondary
law  of  reason’s  particular  branch  of  the  “general  custom”  of  property—the  courts
would find themselves languishing. The common law of property would still exist, but
it  would  wither,  and  wither  as  a  result  of  the  aggregation  of  individual  acts  of
conscience turning from it, which would effectively assert, in the face of the “general
custom”  of  property,  the  capacity  for  individuals  not  directly  involved  in  the
administration of law to shape the legality under which they live. There is a great deal
of  potential  power  to  this.  The  time,  place,  and  activity  of  the  conscientious
engagement with law that Doctor and Student encourages—conscience as everyday, non-
institutional jurisprudence—is everywhere, and cannot be contained; and where it can
be  harnessed  to  generate  what  the  legal  philosopher  Gerald  Postema  regards  as
essential to the proper workings of the common law, a “convergence of judgment,” it
has the power to make the law truly common.15 The law will not be “common” merely,
as Edward Coke later asserts, because it is “giuen to all.”16 It will be common because
every conscience has the opportunity to contribute to its “common reason.”
7 St.  German’s Doctor and Student discuss this  possibility in relation to the status of
“custom,” for in early modern England custom is seen as intrinsic to the common law:
those “divers general customs of old time used through all the realm which have been
accepted and approved by our sovereign lord the king, and his progenitors, and all his
subjects” are, St. German writes, “the customs properly called the common law.17 The
challenge is to keep alive the collective capacity to overturn “custom” when a later age
determines  that  a  given  custom  is  “evil.”18 Hamlet  speaks  of  one  face  of  this
phenomenon when he declares that a custom may be “more honor’d in the breach than
th’observance” (I.iii.16):  any given custom may be obviated by its  non-use.  But  the
more powerful  face of  this phenomenon would show itself  in relation to the active
shaping of new custom. The play speaks to the potential of this greater force when the
nameless messenger reports in Act 4 to Claudius of the attitude and conduct of the
“rabble” joining Laertes in storming Elsinore: 
And as the world were now but to begin,
Antiquity forgot, custom not known,
The ratifiers and props of every word,
[They] cry, “Choose we, Laertes shall be king!”
Caps, hands, and tongues applaud it to the clouds,
“Laertes shall be king, Laertes king!”
IV.v.104-109
8 As an exercise in radical politics, this episode has its limits: the “rabble,” even as they
seem to act for the capacity to create a new world, would stick within the limits of the
world that exists when they replace one sovereign figure with which they are unhappy
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with another. We see a related problem in Doctor and Student. Indeed, in its second part,
first  published  in  1530,  the  Doctor  and  Student  engage  in  a  decided  failure  of
conscience that is all the more marked given the characters’ earlier attempts to argue
that any custom that is not consistent with the law of reason and the law of God may be
overthrown. The thinking that drives this failure is precisely what makes it possible for
Shakespeare’s  most  famous protagonist  to  turn on himself  several  decades  later  as
“villein.” A consideration of Hamlet’s association of himself with the “villein” in light of
St.  German’s  discussion  throws  Hamlet’s  seeming  inability  to  act,  and  his  idea  of
conscience as not enabling but disabling, into new light.
9 The most extended discussion of the “villein” in Doctor and Student focuses on what
goods a “villein” may have, and how he may dispose of them, with the conversation
ranging from the general situation of the villein to exceptional considerations: what
happens, for example, to any goods that a villein may have if he “be made a priest.”19
This  includes  consideration  of  whether  he  may  “make  executors”  after  he  is
“professed” (yes),  and whether the lord then has any power over the goods of  the
former “villein” or the person (no, the lord “must suffer him to abide in his religion
under  the  obedience  of  his  superior,  as  other  religious  persons  do  that  be  not
bondmen.”20)  The priesthood, then, serves the “villein” as a means of exit  from his
status.21 It appears also to be a means for him to dispose of any goods he may own, even
as he takes on the status of a person now dead in law, as he chooses.22 The discussion
nevertheless  emphasizes  the “villein’s”  status as  property even as,  by choosing the
priesthood,  he  would  seem  to  escape  it:  the  lord  may  have  “an  action  of  trespass
against him that received [his villein] into religion without his license,”23 and it is left
to a jury of  twelve men to adjudicate the amount of  damages that the lord should
receive for the loss of his property in the form of another person. These are problems
in and of themselves. Indeed, the role assigned to the jury is a particular problem for
the concerns that I am addressing here, for the jury has itself no opportunity to act
conscientiously—that is,  no opportunity to examine the legal  predicament before it
from the conscientious perspective of how the law of property, which would here make
property of a person, can be reconciled with either the law of reason or the law of God. 
10 In the first volume of his 1628 Institutes, Coke attempts to explain away the existence of
the “villein” in a mythologizing account that claims that “villenage” arises against the
law of nature as a matter of historical developments after Noah’s Flood that witnessed a
shift in humanity from a condition in which “all things were common to all, and free to
all men alike” to one in which men engaged in battle to “mak[e] proper and private
those things that were common.” In the process of making the “private,” men made
property of other men on the battlefield, with the victor free to do with the man made
“bond” to him “as with his beast, or any other chattel, to give, or to sell, or to kill.”24
Coke’s  account  is  blunt:  the  feudal  system  is  a  system  of  the  victor’s  distribution
arriving from historic acts of violence,  and there is  nothing in Coke’s discussion to
suggest  that  he  challenges  this.  Knowledge  of  law,  we  might  assert,  is  in  such  an
instance  conspicuously  not  reconciled  with  the  law  of  reason,  which  “teacheth,”
amongst other things, as St. German’s Doctor notes early on, that “wrong is not to be
done to any man.”25 Yet when St.  German’s Doctor suggests that before he and the
Student proceed to any question relating to villeins they must “first […] see whether it
may stand with conscience, that one man may claim another to be his villein” and the
Student replies “That law hath been so long used in this realm, and in other also, and
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hath been admitted so long in the laws of this realm, and in divers other laws also” that
he “think[s] it is not good now to make doubt, ne to put it in argument, whether it
stand with conscience,” the characters that have earlier declared that no “custom” of
the realm may stand if it cannot be reconciled with conscience leave unquestioned the
most inhumane of the realm’s customs, the “general custom” of property that allows
one man to make property of another.26
11 This is an aspect of the history of the English common law that we cannot ignore. The
legal historian S.F.C. Milsom is matter-of-fact about it in his 2003 Natural History of the
Common Law:  the English common law, as the king’s land law, does not apply to the
“unfree.” Its rules for tenurial holdings originated in “the criteria for the choice of
successor  on  the death  of  a  tenant  by  knight  service,”  and  the  key  historical
development involved “the willingness of royal jurisdiction to override the decisions of
lesser  feudal  courts”  while  leaving  that  system’s disenfranchisements  in  place:  the
“royal remedies” of the common law, he reminds us, were not available “to tenants at
the level of unfree tenure.” “Not until much later did tenants at that level gain their
own roundabout means of protection in royal courts.”27 In the meantime, under the
provisions of this common law “legal monsters grew.”28 It is the banal face of one of
these “monsters” to which Hamlet responds as its protagonist uses the vehicle of the
soliloquy to present us, insistently, with one of the consequences for those for whom
such a law obtains. St. German’s Student asserts that “Conscience must be ordered by
the law,”29 but Hamlet presents us with the consequence of the law’s ordering in a
tragic protagonist whose exhibition of consciousness as displayed in his soliloquies has
no  obvious  way  to  have  a  conscientious  impact  upon  law.  Isolated,  alone,  and
associating  his  general  sense  of  impotence  or  incapacity  with  the  particular  legal
incapacity of the “villein,” Hamlet is a figure for the problems of a common law that
differentially equips the persons for whom it obtains to participate in its rationality, a
problem that Shakespeare can signal most powerfully by associating Hamlet with the
figure rendered property by such a system.
12 The bad quarto’s variant on the opening line of the soliloquy in which Hamlet further
expatiates on his sense of his incapacity, “Why what a dunghill idiote slaue am I?”,
articulates the problem more directly than the later variant in Q2 and the Folio.30 As
“dunghill idiote slaue,” Hamlet is not merely “villein” but the “villein” in his specific
medieval incarnation as the figure required to “carry and recarry the dung of his lord
out of the city, or out of his lord’s manor, unto the land of his lord, and spread […] upon
the land, and such like.”31 In its reference to the figure as an “idiote,” the bad quarto
line also signifies the precise cultural predicament faced by the “villein.” As a person
who  is property,  the  “villein”  is  structurally  excluded  from  participation  in  the
activities by which the law’s rationality was shaped, and thus of no more legal capacity
than an “idiote,” a figure regularly defined as dead in law in legal texts of the period.
But  the  “villein”  is  not  alone  in  having  diminished  legal  capacity  under  England’s
historic  common  law.  As  Coke  notes,  before  the  Conqueror’s  time  even  putatively
“free” tenants were “bound by their tenure to plow & husband &c. [and] therefore they
were not to be returned Burgesses to serve in Parliament, to the end they might intend
the kings husbandrie the better.”32 One premise of England’s feudal common law—that
the king had a right to preside over a property system of differential holdings in land in
which  even  persons  may  be  property—thus  supported  another,  that  the  system’s
divisions of labour could be used fairly to exclude certain members of the realm from
participation  in  the  activities  of  law-making.  Coke’s  tenant,  like  the  “villein,”  is
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separated  from  the  means  of  legal  production,  and  these  historical  facts  have
consequences for the system that results, and the rationality that it claims. Any law
that aspires to enable and preside over any exercise of conscience that is “the most
perfect,  the most pure,  and the most best” must ensure that all  those for whom it
obtains have the equal capacity to participate in its forms of reasoning. The problem
for Hamlet and those he represents is not the “law’s delay” but a law busy distributing
legal  capacity  differentially  in  relation  to  an  individual’s  place  within  a  property-
holding system.
13 When Hamlet castigates himself for his inability to act in relation to a voice that hails
him as “villein,” the violence that he imagines himself experiencing (“Who calls me
villain, breaks my pate across?”, V.ii.572) phantasmatically repeats the originary scene
of violence at which the “villein,” as the person that may be owned and killed, is made.
The recourse to language in the soliloquies is thus ironic, for what Hamlet performs for
us is his exclusion from the possibilities of making or adjudicating in a law in which the
symbolic depropertying that the character experiences as a result of Claudius’s theft of
the crown makes Hamlet generally representative of all those deprived to one degree
or  another  of  the  capacity  by  which  individual  exercises  of  conscience  might  be
discursively reflected as law. Hamlet is  a  figure for the prospect of everyone being
figuratively made the “villein” who bears the lord’s dung to the fields rather his or her
own intellectual capacities to any authoritative place of law, but the imaginary address
of the play is not from but to a legal system that differentially distributes the capacity
to participate in formal law-making and adjudication of law, and that address presents,
through the  representation  of  Hamlet’s  tortured  self-expression  and his  fear  of  an
incapacity  produced  by  conscience  that  renders  him  as  legally  ineffectual  as  the
“villein,” the consequences of the law that makes the “villein” not only for individual
but general consciousness.
14 The ramifications of  the historic existence of  the “villein” for the common law are
profound. The existence of a category of legal person that is himself property vitiates
the  theory  of  the  common law as  a  practice  of  reasoning-in-common.  If  even  one
person is exempted from the genuine capacity to participate in practices of reasoning
about  law,  the  law  that  prevails  is  common  to  all  only  in  a  negative  sense,  in  its
application to all. And its consequences are not contained within the historical moment
or durée in which the “villein” obtains as social fact. In theory, by the beginning of the
seventeenth century the figures of the “villein” and his female counterpart the “naïf”
had dropped away. The National Archives of the United Kingdom does, however, hold
manumission records for both into the late sixteenth century.33 But the inability of St.
German’s Doctor and Student to broach the topic of the existence of the “villein” as a
matter of conscience as late as 1528 shows how difficult it is for a culture to extract
itself from historic social forms and the forms of the thought to which they are tied.
There  is,  moreover,  no  easy  accounting  for  either  the  individual  or  general  social
consequences. What might the English common law have been and what forms of life
might  it  have  supported  if  it  had  never  granted  the  premise  that  the  making  of
property out of persons was something the law of God was willing to “suffer”?
15 Hamlet himself is placed in vexed relation to these difficulties. Amongst other things,
Hamlet  does  not  presume what  Jacques  Rancière  has  argued  is  critical  to  any  just
culture,  the  presumption  of  the  equality  of  intelligence.34 The  “groundlings,”  for
example,  can  be  dismissed as  being  “for  the  most  part  capable  of  nothing  but
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inexplicable dumb shows and noise” (III.ii.11-12), and when Hamlet declares to Horatio
in Act 5 that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, sent to their death in England, are not
“near”  his  conscience  (V.ii.58),  he  reflects  not  only  a  willingness  to  value  others
differentially, but attributes to conscience a spatial dimension that articulates larger
dilemmas for law: no one person’s conscience should be the means to consign others to
death;  and the law must  act  not  to  exclude any from its  shaping consciousness  or
“reason,” or shunt them to any structural margin or outside. The law should work,
instead,  to  ensure  a  comprehensive  inclusion  of  all  in  its  rationality.  Hamlet’s
complaint, moreover, of the toe of the peasant coming near the heel of the courtier is
part and parcel of these dilemmas: the peasant’s toe is the metonymic lever that might
undo his hierarchically-structured world. “Villein” may be the dire name that Hamlet
gives to his sense of his own incapacity, but incapacity itself is (it seems) something
that he would happily leave to others. The character himself suffers for those instances
in  which  conscience  fails  him,  and  he  does  not  presume  the  necessity  of  equal
participation  in  the  law’s  rationality.  Reasoning  mostly  alone,  Hamlet  is  unmoored
from those with whom he might shape a law consistent with the law of reason, and is
thus a figure for all those prospectively rendered “coward” because they neither seek
for themselves nor seek to create the opportunity to yoke their capacity to reason to
the capacities of others imagined as capacities equal to their own.
16 The  experience  of  the  play  in  performance  furnishes,  however,  a  vital  extra-legal
means for cultivating the very thing at stake, the common law as a form of reasoning-
in-common requiring not simply the public co-ordination of conscience, but the radical
inclusion of the all in the law’s reason. No one is going to law in the theatre, no one
actively  arguing  or  judging  a  case.  But  the  arena,  public  and  open,  affords  every
member of the audience the opportunity to exercise his or her capacity to contribute to
the “convergence of  judgment” upon which the common law depends.  Play-going’s
capacity  to  achieve  this  purpose  will  be  intensified  where  the  content of  the  play
engages  any  kind  of  legal  question  or  legal  consideration—or,  perhaps,  more
importantly  engages  the  kind  of  concern  that  the  common  law  courts  (in  their
everyday fulfillment, in practice, of the “law of man”) leave; but the events of theatrical
performance and play-going are always formal opportunities for participation in public
intellection that may be as important, if not more important, to the common law as a
practice  of  reasoning-in-common precisely  because  there  are  no  constraints  in  the
theatrical arena on one’s participation. In “play,” both institutional practitioners and
the polity’s members may take up in a fiction, in something like a dream, matters that
may otherwise escape the law’s attention—or matters that it may “leave” to conscience.
17 More  specifically,  in  relation  to  Hamlet’s  isolation  from  others  and  tortured
consciousness,  playgoers  have  the  opportunity  to  experience,  in  congregation  with
others, the capacity of conscience, even as it is negatively inflected, so that they might
feel the potential of its collective force; and the social experience is prospectively one
in which the theory of the corporate public person of the body politic associated with
another idea of sovereignty, that of the fiscal king, may be felt as potential arising from
the  shared  capacity  for  reasoning,  especially  as  exercised  in  focused  collective
attention to the object of the play.35 This is to say that the play may indeed be the
“thing” by which to catch the conscience of the king—but not the king as individual
leaping from his seat in the shock of taking in a representation of something like his
murder of his brother, but the king as the entity arising from and expressed by the
members of the polity in their cohesion (in performance represented metonymically by
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those in the audience taking in the “thing” of the play). The experience of the play is
the experience of being oriented to something other than that which is one’s own, and
it  reinvigorates  an  idea  of  what  the  common  law  might  be  if  it  were  not  already
“stolen,” that is,  not a system of property distribution organized in relation to the
feudal king that distributes legal capacity differentially between persons.
18 As it is collective rationality that is at stake, as the play moves towards its conclusion it
stages for us, at one of the lowliest, scenes of work, two men engaging in a conversation
about law in which they voice critical perspective upon it. The scene involves a tutorial
dynamic in which the first gravedigger gives his mate a lesson in how to speak in ways
that place their lowly labour in the larger scheme of valuation furnished by belief in
the  very  thing  Hamlet  seems to  doubt  in  his  most  famous  soliloquy,  the  Christian
scheme of redemption. Toying, in his consideration of suicide, with what the “law of
God” would prohibit, Hamlet toys with a break with a host of fictions, including the
fiction that the law of God suffers a law that makes property out of men. The grave-
digging clowns get,  however,  to  the concern that  Hamlet  leaves alone,  the ways in
which the system produces differences in persons according to their class. Assuming
their right to consider the jurisprudence in two cases, one of them fictional, one of
them real, the gravediggers talk law in order to deliver class critique, most directly in
their judgment of the holding in Ophelia’s case: “Will you ha’ the truth an’t? If this had
not been a gentlewoman she should have been buried out  a’  Christian burial”  (V.i.
23-25). From this perspective, feudal class structures affect not just the common law,
but the canon law. But what matters is not so much the content of the clowns’ talk but
the theatrical fact of it. The represented conversation invites from the audience critical
perspective on the fact of their labour as organized by a legal system that would keep
them in a menial place, one far removed from the places in which the law is made and
adjudicated.  Hamlet  will  later  complain that  the first  gravedigger,  when left  alone,
sings while he works, but from the perspective of theatrical representation in 1603 or
1604 the conversation about law that he shares with his mate is the greater provocation
for the audience. 
19 The “Blackadder” joke in which Hugh Laurie’s  Shakespeare cuts a deal  with Rowan
Atkinson’s theatrical impresario to cut lines from “To be or not to be” as long as he may
have  the  gravediggers  back  in—“both  of  them!”—is  relevant  here.36 The  exchange
between the gravediggers is vital, for what is needed is not a monologue about the law,
or a soliloquy expressing incapacity in relation to it, but the representation of the kind
of conversation from which a truly conscientious common law would be shaped, the
conversation of even the lowliest workers treated as if it were just as important to the
shaping  and  adjudication  of  law  as  the  conversations  of  the  law’s  specialized
practitioners. Artificial reason must always be in dialectical exchange with the reason
of all members of the realm. The fictional dramatic dialogue in Act 5 of Hamlet extends,
in short, the dialogic work of St. German’s Doctor and Student in a way that promotes the
very thing that St. German’s characters shy away from defending, the inclusion of even
the lowliest workers in the rationality of the law as discursive agents rather than mere
objects. My central contention is this: both Hamlet’s articulation of his sense of legal
incapacity  and  the  conversation  between  the  gravediggers  permit  the  theatre  to
function as a space within which those present may feel the “form and pressure” (III.ii.
24) of their own conscientious capacity to make law by situating themselves in active
relation to it: who, after all, wants to be either “coward” or “villein,” and who, to be
unjust?  This  capacity  will  be  just  to  the  degree  that  it  orients  itself  to  an ideal  of
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“perfect conscience” that comprehensively engages the rational capacities of all. To the
extent that we articulate the ways in which Shakespeare’s dramatic canon confronts
the problems of the English common law in early modernity the better equipped we are
to  let  Shakespeare  open  out  onto  and  assist  with  our  imagining  of  contemporary
legalities, not just for those cultures for which the common law is inheritance, but for
all  legal  regimes.  Historicist  work thus  has  the  opportunity  to  support  the  kind of
democracy  that  Hamlet could  at  best  only  anticipate  and  which  we  have  not  yet
achieved—a democracy that is something other than, as Jacques Rancière has argued, a
state of “oligarchic law.”37
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ABSTRACTS
The essay proposes that Christopher St. German’s legal text, Doctor and Student, first published in
1528, and published subsequently in several editions across the sixteenth century, illuminates
the particular legal problem that Hamlet invokes in the soliloquies in which he declares that
conscience “does make cowards [of us all]” and turns on himself as “villain” or “villein,” the
lowest figure in the feudal hierarchy. Hamlet’s invocations of conscience and his reference to
himself as “villein” speak to a fundamental problem of the historic common law of England,
which differentially distributes legal capacity to persons in relation to their place in a property-
holding system. Doctor and Student asserts the importance of conscience to the common law even
as the characters of  the dialogue engage in a failure of  conscience that illuminates Hamlet’s
engagement  with  the  conjunction  of  conscience  and  law.  The  experience  of  the  play  in
performance in 1603/4 is one that compensates for the failure of conscience epitomized in the
handling of the “villein” in Doctor and Student and Shakespeare’s representation of Hamlet by
cultivating the capacity  for  the thing upon which a  truly  “common” law would depend,  the
comprehensive inclusion of all in the law’s rationality.
Cet article se propose d’analyser à la lumière de Doctor and Student, texte de droit écrit par le
juriste Christopher St-German et publié en 1528 (nombreuses rééditions tout au long du XVIe
siècle),  le  problème juridique qui  apparaît  dans le  soliloque d’Hamlet  sur la  conscience et  la
couardise (III.i) et lorsqu’il se présente (II.ii) à la fois comme un homme « vil » et un « vilain »,
situé au plus bas de la hiérarchie féodale (« villain »/« villein » en anglais). L’appel à la conscience
et la mention du statut de « vilain » font écho à un problème essentiel  du « droit  commun »
(common law) anglais, qui attribue des degrés de responsabilité légale différents en fonction de la
place de chacun au sein du système foncier. Doctor and Student, dialogue dont les personnages
aboutissent à un échec de la conscience, maintient néanmoins que la conscience est un élément
important  de  la  common  law,  thème  que  l’on  retrouve  dans  les  réflexions  d’Hamlet.  Si  le
traitement du « vilain » dans le dialogue de St-German et le personnage d’Hamlet dans la pièce de
Shakespeare évoquent un échec de la conscience, l’expérience de la représentation scénique d’
Hamlet en  1603/1604  invite  au  contraire  à  cultiver  la  qualité  sur  laquelle  repose  tout  droit
véritablement « commun », l’inclusion de tous dans la rationalité du droit.
INDEX
Keywords: Coke Edward, common law, conscience, Hamlet, law of God, reason, St. German
Christopher, villein
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